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Abstract. Butler’s idea of evolution was developed over the publication of four books,
several articles and essays between 1863 and 1890. These publications, although never
achieving the success expected by Butler, proposed a psychological elaboration of
evolution (robustly enforced by Lamarck’s philosophy), called ‘unconscious memory’.
This was strongly in contrast with the materialistic approach suggested by Darwin’s
natural selection. Starting with a historical introduction, this paper aspires to ascertain
the logic, meaning and signiﬁcance of Butler’s idea of ‘unconscious memory’ in the post-
Darwinian physiological and psychological Pan-European discussion. Particular
attention is devoted to demonstrating that Butler was not only a populariser of science
but also an active protagonist in the late Victorian psychological debate.
Keywords: Samuel Butler, Psychological evolution, Ewald Hering, Charles Darwin,
Lamarckism, Unconscious memory
Introduction
On the 2nd December 1882, Samuel Butler delivered a lecture entitled
‘On Memory as a Key to the Phenomena of Heredity’ at the Working
Men’s College in London. In the lecture, Butler tried to explain to his
fellow citizens the importance of rethinking evolution in a Lamarckian
way. In 1882, circumstances had led to Butler’s voice not being given
much credence within the British scientiﬁc community. Butler was,
therefore, directing his attention to the general public with the aim of
persuading the public to the revolutionary potential of his ideas con-
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cerning Lamarckism, memory and heredity. Most signiﬁcantly, the
ideas that Butler championed were topics that were being widely dis-
cussed across Europe; however, in England where the faith in Darwin’s
theory of natural selection still remained strong, this ‘new science’ was
initially met with reserve. Lamarck’s work was well known in Britain
since the 1830s and the publication of Charles Lyell’s Principles of
Geology (1830–1833). But after the publication of Darwin’s Origin
(1859), Lamarck’s theory of evolution started to be ignored mostly
because of its emphasis on the will of the individual in the evolutionary
process.
In his lecture, Butler sought to explain the role that memory played
in heredity. He was aware that the question of exactly how inheritance
occurred was still unanswered and he believed that an elaboration of
Lamarck’s concept of the inheritance of acquired characteristics would
have provided a solution to the matter. However, to substantiate his
claims, and perhaps to detract from his audiences doubt about either the
scientiﬁc credibility of Lamarck’s ideas, or of his own credentials to
speak on this matter, Butler gave an account of his own research in the
context of the work performed by European psychologists and neu-
rologists. Butler insisted, in particular, in showing a similarity between
his work and that of the German physiologist Ewald Hering. In the late
nineteenth century, Hering was becoming well-known across Europe for
his research on heredity and memory, colour theory and binocular vi-
sion. An extract from the lecture stated:
We say it is a phenomenon of heredity that chickens should be laid
as eggs in the ﬁrst instance and clergymen born as babies, but,
beyond the fact that we know heredity extremely well to look at
and to do business with, we say that we know nothing about it. I
have for some years maintained this to be a mistake and have
urged, in company with Professor Hering, of Prague, and others,
that the connection between memory and heredity is so close that
there is no reason for regarding the two as generically diﬀerent,
though for convenience sake it may be well to specify them by
diﬀerent names (Jones, 1930, p. 57).
This highlights the central point of this article which aims to re-examine
the role of Butler in the late Victorian scientiﬁc scene: in his work Butler
was not simply popularising European science. Instead, he tried to be an
active protagonist in the debate by looking at evolution from a psy-
chological perspective.
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Butler’s idea of evolution was developed over the publication of four
books, several articles and essays between 1863 and 1890. Although
none of these publications achieved the status or recognition that he had
hoped for, in them he proposed a psychological elaboration of evolution
(robustly enforced by Lamarck’s philosophy), called ‘unconscious
memory’. Butler’s ‘unconscious memory’ was in stark contrast to the
materialistic approach suggested by Darwin’s natural selection, and,
Butler argued, it had more scientiﬁc backing than the theory of pan-
genesis that Darwin had suggested as a potential physiological expla-
nation of the mechanisms of heredity.
The reasons for Butler’s dismissal of Darwin’s ideas were both per-
sonal and methodological. On the personal side, Butler had engaged
with Darwin in a bitter quarrel over diﬀerent interpretations of evolu-
tion. The quarrel started after the publication of Butler’s second sci-
entiﬁc book, Evolution Old and New which was published in March
1879, and it continued until Darwin’s death in 1882. The main conse-
quence of the quarrel was the total isolation of Butler and his ideas from
the British Darwinian community. At the heart of the quarrel lay a
simple misunderstanding created by the forgotten acknowledgment of
Butler’s Evolution Old and New. This was to be found in the English
translation of the bibliography of Erasmus Darwin by E. Krause enti-
tled, Life of Erasmus Darwin (1879) with a preface by Charles Darwin
(Barlow, 170). Several studies have explored the importance of the
quarrel focusing on both its public and private dimensions (Barlow,
1958, pp. 167–221; Jones, 1911; Paradis, 2004, pp. 307–331). However,
it is important to emphasise that the quarrel between Butler and Darwin
was more than an ad-hominem attack (Irvine, 1955, pp. 220–224) upon a
forgotten citation (Pauly, 1982, p. 161).
For Butler evolution was a matter of Lamarckian designed memory.
But for Darwin, there was little space for any blueprint in biology. As
Janet Brown argues, ‘pangenesis was the highly abstract notion that
every tissue, cell and living part of an organism produced minute, un-
seen gemmules (or what he sometimes called granules or germs) which
carried inheritable characteristics and were transmitted to the oﬀspring
via the reproductive process’ (Browne, 2002, p. 275). In 1868, Darwin,
in The variation of animals and plants under domestication, was careful to
explain that each part of an organism produced only gemmules about
itself and not about the organism as a whole (Darwin, 1868, p. 374).
Individual gemmules did not have the complete designed (biological)
map of the whole creature.
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Butler used the word ‘unconscious’ in relation to evolution for the
ﬁrst time in 1872 in the novel Erewhon. This term subsequently became
the label adopted by the writer to describe his evolutionary idea. But-
ler’s main books on science, Life and Habit (1878) and Unconscious
Memory (1881), hypothesised that there was a substantial overlap be-
tween the concept of memory and heredity to reintroduce causality into
the evolutionary process. Butler’s idea of ‘unconscious memory’, rested
on a process of biological reproduction and preservation of information
from one generation to the other.
This was explained as a substantial chemical continuity between
memory and heredity. This continuity was conceived in Butler’s Luck or
Cunning? (1886) by employing a new interpretation of the Lamarckian
concept of inheritance of acquired characteristics in relation to Dmitri
Mendeleev’s law. A similar hypothesis was developed independently in
France by The´odule Ribot and also in Germany by Ewald Hering.
Samuel Butler has historically been considered by academics as a
novelist with an interest in science. Butler was a novelist, yes, but he also
spent more than thirty years of his life ﬁghting against the orthodoxy of
Victorian science in order to explain to his fellow countrymen his vision
of evolution. The place of Butler’s science in contemporary Victorian
studies is still very complex. Literary scholars such as Gillian Beer and
Sally Shuttleworth consider Butler’s work predominately as a form of
‘literature and science’ without any relevant inﬂuence upon the scientiﬁc
debate (Beer, 2007; Shuttleworth, 2007). As an example, Shuttleworth’s
‘Evolutionary Psychology and The way of all Flesh’ explores the psy-
chological meaning of Butler’s most well-known novel looking at
questions regarding personal identity and continuity of personality
(Shuttleworth, 2007, pp. 147–148). Shuttleworth’s essay emphasises the
importance of looking at the theory presented in Life and Habit only
through Butler’s ﬁction, because ﬁction is the only place where Butler’s
science can be taken seriously (Shuttleworth, 2007, pp. 151–155). A
similar reading of Butler’s work is proposed by Beer in the essay ‘Butler,
Memory and the future’. Here, Butler’s ﬁnal novel Erewhon Revisited is
used to demonstrate the importance of Butler’s theory of memory and
heredity (Beer, 2007, pp. 51–55).
Historians of science are slowly starting to show Butler’s place in the
Victorian scientiﬁc scene. The works of Paradis (2007), Fyfe and
Lightman (2007) and Forsdyke (2006, 2009) exempliﬁed the importance
of Butler’s scientiﬁc view of evolution. Moreover, the scientiﬁc work of
Butler is now becoming increasingly recognised as forming a contri-
bution to the Victorian marketplace of science although only in the
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form of a popularisation (Lightman, 2007b, pp. 113–143). Lightman, in
the essay ‘A conspiracy of One: Butler, Natural Theology, and Victo-
rian Popularization’ illustrates Butler’s importance as a populariser but
mostly limits his inﬂuence to the popular sphere (Lightman, 2007b, pp.
118–120). Lightman’s essay also does not place much signiﬁcance in
Butler’s scientiﬁc idea. He suggests that Butler’s Lamarckism was used
to exercise criticism over Darwin and other Darwinian professionals
(Lightman, 2007b, pp. 131–133) and ‘represented a threat to the
emerging scientiﬁc professionalization of Darwin’s era’ (Lightman,
2007b, p. 138).
This argument has been expanded upon by David Gillott’s recent
book: Samuel Butler Against the Professionals (2015). Gillott oﬀers an
overview of the problematic relationship between Butler and other
professionals by tracing the history of Butler’s life through an analysis
of the evolution of Butler’s epistemological knowledge. Gillott uses the
Darwin-Butler relationship and associated quarrel in order to show how
Butler moved from believing in the professional objectivity of knowl-
edge to considering professionals as individuals interested only in their
personal careers (Gillott, 2015, pp. 49–81).
A diﬀerent reading of Butler’s science is provided by the introduction
of Laura Otis’s Organic Memory (1994), where Butler’s work is dis-
cussed alongside that of European psychologists and physiologists
including Ewald Hering and The´odule Ribot. Otis’s work conﬁrms the
link between Butler and other European scientists. The same argument
is also, again, marginally suggested by Schacter’s history of psychology
where Butler and Hering are presented as forgotten pioneers of the
history of discipline (Schacter, 2001, pp 110–112).
The central aim of this article is to re-examine the role of Butler in
the late Victorian scientiﬁc scene. Butler was not simply a populariser of
European science. Instead, he tried to be an active protagonist in the
debate by looking at evolution from a psychological perspective. A re-
evaluation of Butler’s scientiﬁc writing then becomes necessary. In
particular, Butler’s scientiﬁc writings need to be taken seriously as they
can also help us to understand the science of the mind. Inﬂuenced by
Lamarck, Hering and Ribot, Butler sought to bring these important
ideas, which were inﬂuential and widely accepted in Europe, to Britain.
However his complex relationship with Darwin and other Victorian
scientists undermined his attempt to do so.
The analysis of Butler’s work will be examined in relation to the
existing critical scholarship on the history of nineteenth century Euro-
pean psychology. Psychology was a branch of philosophy until the
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1870s, when it started to develop as an independent scientiﬁc discipline
in Europe. Thus far, this has mostly been treated as a consequence of
Darwin’s hypothesis of evolution (Richards, 1989, 1993, 2002; Otis,
1994). Although frequently linked with natural selection, psychology
also developed along other scientiﬁc paths in both theory and practice
across Europe. In respect of the practical aspect of the rise of psy-
chology, the history of science oﬀers an extensive literature. For in-
stance, Laura Otis’ recent publication Muller’s Lab (2007), Simon
Schaﬀer’s pamphlet From Physics to Anthropology and Back Again
(1994) and Mandler’s A History of Modern Experimental Psychology
(2007) oﬀer an historical view of the rise of nineteenth century labora-
tories, although limiting their analyses to national cases. The work of
Kurt Danziger, including ‘The positivist repudiation of Wundt’ (1979)
and Constructing the Subject (1994), also oﬀers a constructivist example
of the intellectual history of psychological research from the nineteenth
century (especially in Germany) to the emergence of contemporary
psychology. The main aim of Danziger is to consider the psychological
methodology as a kind of social and cultural practice rather than as a
simple matter of technique. However, in all of this literature, the aspect
that is missing is the European dimension of the debate and the con-
sequent role of psychology in the cultural and philosophical debate
before the rise of laboratories.
As exempliﬁed by Rabinbach’s The Human Motor (1992) the study of
the historical, political and cultural developments of nineteenth century
science can only be conducted within a wider-European perspective.
Therefore, the rise of psychology and the history of its pioneers oﬀer
one of the best examples for understanding European science and cul-
ture between the 1860s and the turn of the twentieth century.
Butler’s Scientiﬁc Writing: The European Connections
Samuel Butler’s work on evolution was based on a large critical review
of the main nineteenth century scientiﬁc texts. Between 1863 and 1890
Butler read, translated, and popularised in his work a great deal of
English, French and German evolutionary literature. Beer explains in
Darwin’s Plots that in the Victorian period scientiﬁc language and
narratives were moving ‘rapidly and freely to and fro between scientists
and non-scientists’ (Beer, 2000, p. 5). However, in the Victorian period
there was also a clear distinction between practitioners and popularisers.
As Lightman has explained, the Victorian populariser was often not a
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practitioner and his/her work was ‘mainly focused on writing about
nature’ (Lightman, 2007a, p. 13). Paul White’s book on Huxley also
looks at the establishment of professionalism in the 1870s stressing the
need to distinguish the creation of scientiﬁc knowledge from its popu-
larisation (White, 2003, pp. 51–58). There is, therefore, as suggested by
Lightman a distinction to make between the Victorian practitioner who
produced scientiﬁc knowledge and the populariser whose main job was
to entertain the masses talking about science (Lightman, 2007a, pp. 35–
37).
In Life and Habit, Butler made a controversial statement about the
production of scientiﬁc knowledge: ‘I say that the term ‘‘scientiﬁc’’
should be applied (only that they would not like it) to the nice sensible
people who know what’s what rather than to the discovering class’
(Butler, 1910a, p. 35). Therefore, for Butler making science was not
simply a question of conducting experiments or collecting specimens in
remote locations. Instead, it was possible to produce new scientiﬁc
knowledge simply via knowing and reﬂecting on the ideas of others.
Samuel Butler made this way of producing scientiﬁc literature his
personal writing style (especially in his biological volumes). He read,
commented on and critiqued Darwinian and non-Darwinian literature
and tried, especially in Evolution Old and New (1879), to link the present
Darwinian science with the Lamarckism of the past. Butler tried to
show how certain ideas proposed by Darwin owed a deep debt to the
work of the previous generation of naturalists, especially Lamarck.
However, he also tried to look at how evolution was currently discussed
across Europe with a particular focus on the notion of memory.
In 1878, with the publication of Life and Habit, Butler recognised
that the ﬁrst naturalist to identify a link between memory and heredity
was Lamarck in his 1809 work, Philosophie Zoologique (i.e. the concept
of ‘inheritance’). Butler’s use of Lamarck was due to his desire to
propose ‘the re-introduction of teleology into organic life’ (Jones, p. 66).
However, Butler’s intention in resurrecting Lamarck’s philosophy was
not just instrumental to his criticism of Darwin’s natural selection.
Butler’s aim was also to complement Darwinism with Lamarckism via a
historical examination of the two ideas.
Lamarck’s Philosophie Zoologique (1809), proposed a hypothesis of
evolution (called transformisme) where the idea of transformation im-
plied a designed evolution of living species. Lamarck’s philosophy was
primarily progressive although it did involve some divergences (Ja-
blonka and Lamb, 1999, p. 3). Butler accepted Lamarck’s idea that in
nature there is no extinction, and evolution determines the passage from
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simple to complex forms of life based on a continuous reproduction of
an ‘inheritance of acquired characteristics’. Lamarckian evolution was
based on a process of adaptation of the organism to its environment.
This adaptation was explained by the naturalist via a process of use and
disuse of certain characteristics (Lamarck, 1914, p. 113).
In Zoological Philosophy, Lamarck located the source of vital stim-
ulation within the nervous system. Following the eighteenth-century
physiological tradition, Lamarck considered the nervous ﬂuids as the
principle link existing between living things and the environments
(Jordanova, 1984, p. 76). In the Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans
Vertebres (1815), Lamarck even identiﬁed an organic component, a
ﬂuid, to determine the functions of the living body (Corsi, 1998, p. 189).
In The Politics of Evolution (1989), Adrian Desmond explained that
Lamarck’s work inﬂuenced the early nineteenth century scientiﬁc debate
in England (but also in wider-Europe) and further shaped the medical
and biological background of the next generation of scientists. How-
ever, it is important to observe that after the publication of the Origin,
Lamarck’s work started to be dismissed by many in Britain. Butler’s
scientiﬁc work and desire to resurrect Lamarckian ideas therefore be-
comes a primary example with which to understand the importance of
Lamarck’s idea of ‘inheritance’ in Europe. In particular, in Unconscious
Memory and Luck, or Cunning?, Butler explained how Lamarck’s
hypothesis of inheritance developed in both physiology and philosophy
across the continent. Butler recognised traces of Lamarckism in the
research of Ewald Hering in Germany, The´odule Ribot in France and
William Benjamin Carpenter, Herbert Spencer and George Romanes in
England.
Ewald Hering (1834–1918) is the key protagonist of Butler’s popu-
larisation of Lamarckian ideas. From 1880 and the publication of
‘‘Unconscious Memory’’, Butler cited and discussed Hering’s work in all
of his scientiﬁc books or essays. Educated as a physicist in Leipzig,
Hering subsequently worked as a physiologist at the University of
Vienna between 1865 and 1870, in Prague between 1870 and 1895, and
again in Leipzig between 1895 and 1908 (Baumann, 1992; Turner, 1993
1994; Janko, 1995). As a physiologist, Hering became known in Europe
largely due to his research into colour vision and spatial perception.
Nonetheless, he was also the ﬁrst scientist in Germany to promote the
idea of organic memory as a biological hypothesis and to conduct
experiments on it (Otis, 1994, pp. 20–39).
Hering worked at the heart of a dynamic debate, and conducted
diﬀerent types of research. In Vienna, he challenged physiologist Her-
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mann von Helmholtz’s colour-vision theory. In the same university, he
conducted research on respiration and, in 1868, with psychoanalyst
Josef Breuer (1842–1925), demonstrated the role of the ‘vagus’ nerve in
the regulation of breathing. However, Hering’s work was also inﬂu-
enced by the philosophies of Kant, Goethe (scientiﬁc theory of colours),
Schelling and Fichte, alongside the arguably more scientiﬁc work of
other physiologists like Johannes Muller and Haeckel. As a result, his
approach to the subject was partly philosophical and partly scientiﬁc.
In 1870, Hering presented a lecture entitled Das Geda¨chtniss als all-
gemeine Funktion der organisirter Substanz (Memory as a Universal
Function of Organised Matter), at the University of Prague. The lecture
rapidly became one of the most frequently quoted texts in the ﬁeld. It
gave rise to a series of translations and was largely used among Euro-
pean physiologists. In Britain, the ﬁrst reference to Hering and the
notion of Memory and Heredity was published by Ray Lankester in
Nature in 1876 under the title of: ‘Perigenesis v. pangenesis – Haeckel’s
new theory of heredity’. Lankester brieﬂy mentioned the name of
Hering but without providing a full account of his idea (Lankester,
1876, p.237). The ﬁrst full account of Hering’s work was, then, provided
by Butler in 1880 in Unconscious Memory where the paper was trans-
lated and published as an integral part of the book (Butler, 1920, pp.
63–86).
Hering’s paper identiﬁed memory as a fundamental reproductive
capability of living matter. The main scientiﬁc hypothesis enclosed in
Hering’s lecture was the necessity to link materialistic science (physi-
ology) with the philosophy of the mind (psychology). Hering’s study
focused on memory linked to the body, moving it into the realms of
physiological processes. It involved scientiﬁc concepts such as repro-
duction, conservation changes, and memory as hereditary but also
philosophical problems. A quote from Hering’s lecture exempliﬁes this
point:
The word ‘‘memory’’ is often understood as though it meant
nothing more than our faculty of intentionally reproducing ideas or
series of ideas. But when the ﬁgures and events of bygone days rise
up again unbidden in our minds, is not this also an act of recol-
lection or memory? We have a perfect right to extend our con-
ception of memory so as to make it embrace involuntary
reproductions, of sensations, ideas, perceptions, and eﬀorts; but we
ﬁnd, on having done so, that we have so far enlarged her bound-
aries that she proves to be an ultimate and original power, the
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source, and at the same time the unifying bond, of our whole
conscious life (Butler, 1920, p. 68).
Hering located the origin of human memory, and that of animals and
plants, in the reﬂexes and instincts of primitive ancestors (Otis, 1994, p.
13). Consequently, memory was incorporated into the research of the
human nervous system. Thus, memory became, in Hering’s work, part
of a new physiological interpretation of the human body in which the
brain and the nervous system were considered as the base for the new
medicine of the human body. Memory also became the key for heredity
by explaining the continuity between generations without a drastic de-
nial of its philosophical importance. Hering seems to focus particularly
on this point at the end of the lecture where he declares without any
further doubts:
The most sublime ideas, though never so immortalised in speech or
letters, are yet nothing for heads that are out of harmony with
them; they must be not only heard, but reproduced; and both
speech and writing would be in vain were there not an inheritance
of inward and outward brain development, growing in corre-
spondence with the inheritance of ideas that are handed down from
age to age, and did not an enhanced capacity for their reproduction
on the part of each succeeding generation accompany the thoughts
that have been preserved in writing. Man’s conscious memory
comes to an end at death, but the unconscious memory of Nature is
true and ineradicable: whoever succeeds in stamping upon her the
impress of his work, she will remember him to the end of time
(Butler, 1920, pp. 85–86).
At the same time as Hering, Lamarckism was also discussed in France.
In his scientiﬁc writing, Butler cited the works of important French
Lamarckian biologists such as Yves Delage (1854–1920), Felix Le
Dantec (1869–1917), Jean-Louis de Lanessan (1843–1919), and Armand
de Quatrefages (1810–1892). They all conducted research very close to
Lamarckian ideas. They considered Darwin’s work as a simple devel-
opment of Lamarck’s evolutionist paradigm (Barsanti, 2005, pp. 306–
307). Even more controversially, Lanessan in his 1883 book Le Trans-
formisme negated any originality to Darwin’s work (de Lanessan, 1883,
p. 23).
In Life and Habit, in particular, Butler largely refers to the work of
another French scientist: The´odule Ribot. After his appointment as
Professor at the College de France in 1880s, Ribot opened the ﬁrst
laboratory of experimental psychology in the country. He deﬁned
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memory and heredity along the same lines as Hering. However, in
contrast to the German tradition, which was based mostly on empirical
research, Ribot divided his time between empirical research and pro-
moting psychology to both scientists and the general public.
Ribot’s main scholarly interest was to embed ‘memory’ into physi-
ological research whilst remaining aware of its philosophical roots. It is,
therefore, interesting to note the research approach adopted by the
French psychologist. Although Ribot was trained in philosophy, he
practiced clinical and experimental psychology from 1873 to 1885. As
suggested by Gullin, Ribot did not only open up experimental psy-
chology in France but also re-shaped the study of natural science in
relation to ‘l’anatomie, la physiologie, la pathologie mentale, l’histoire,
l’anthropologie’ (Guillin, 2004, pp. 165–181). Ribot’s research was,
therefore, received with interest by the scientiﬁc community. Nonethe-
less, it also attracted the interest of philosophers like Henri Bergson
(Otis and Nicolas, 2005; Nicolas and Charvillat, 2001). Otis explains
that between the 1880s and 1890s, the neurological journal Brain fre-
quently cited Ribot’s research and Le Maladies de la Memoire became
the most quoted neurological publication of the late nineteenth century
(Otis, 1994, p. 15).
Memory, as deﬁned by Ribot in the introduction of Les Maladies de
la Me´moire, was ‘Par essence, un fait biologique; par accident un fait
psychologique’ (Ribot, 1881, p. 1) and made sense only when merged
with heredity, instinct and habit (Otis, 1994, pp. 14–18). Indeed, for the
French psychologist memory and heredity are intrinsically the same.
Ribot’s hypothesis criticised the orthodoxy of biology which gave
precedent to conscious memory and cut it oﬀ from the domains of the
unconscious (i.e. memory as a biological phenomenon).
Like Hering, Ribot recognised the potential of Lamarck’s idea
of’inheritance’ and its role in evolution. For Ribot, memory could only
be described using a new scientiﬁc terminology and it was not made of
an ‘indeﬁnable’ metaphysical substance. It was, instead, a biochemical
composition which leaves physical traces and residues. In this way,
memory became subject to a process of accumulation (‘le capital
accumule’ (Ribot, 1881, p. 6)) which, citing the work of Henry Maud-
sley and Joseph Delboef, Ribot called molecular vibration. Memory, for
Ribot, required a dynamic association that, through repetition, estab-
lished a stable primitive anatomical connection (Ribot, 1881, p. 16).
In England, Butler recognised and discussed Lamarckian ideas in the
work of William Benjamin Carpenter, Herbert Spencer and George
Romanes. In Life and Habit Butler discussed in detail Carpenter’s
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Principles of Mental Physiology (1874). Butler suggested that Carpenter
produced one of the ﬁrst physiological interpretations of the role of the
mind in the economy of the body, largely inﬂuencing the medical and
physiological debate afterward (including himself). Butler recognised
only one problem in Carpenter’s work: ‘The only issue between myself
and Dr. Carpenter would appear to be, that Dr. Carpenter, himself an
acknowledged leader in the scientiﬁc world, restricts the term ‘‘scien-
tiﬁc’’ to the people who know that they know’ (Butler, 1910a, p. 35).
In Unconscious Memory Butler discussed Spencer’s contribution to
the scientiﬁc and philosophical debate. Butler recognised Spencer’s
scientiﬁc writing as the cornerstone for a new interpretation of evolution
in between Darwinism and Lamarckism. Butler appreciated that
Spencer’s work (which was also translated into French by Ribot) was
purely theoretical and directed to a specialised philosophical audience.
It, therefore, deployed a methodology that was very similar to his own.
Butler’s opinion of Spencer’s work changed over the years. In 1884,
Butler partially dismissed Spencer’s work declaring ‘no writer that I
know of except Professor Hering of Prague, […] has shown a compre-
hension of the fact that these expressions are unexplained so long as
‘‘heredity,’’ whereby they explain them, is unexplained; and none of
them sees the importance of emphasizing Memory, and making it as it
were the keystone of the system.’ (Butler, 1884, pp. 228–229) However,
in 1889, in the essay ‘The Deadlock in Darwinism’, Butler recognised
that ‘The Lamarckian system has all along been maintained by Mr.
Herbert Spencer’ (Butler, 1908, p. 240). Butler was not able to see ‘any
important diﬀerence in the main position taken by him and Lamarck’
(Butler, 1908, p. 240).
Finally, mention should be made of the work of George Romanes. In
1881, Romanes, while taking a position in the Darwin–Butler quarrel in
defence of the naturalist, publicly rejected Butler’s hypothesis of
unconscious evolution in his review of Unconscious Memory published
in Nature. Romanes insisted on showing how Butler’s ideas did not have
any scientiﬁc value because he was not a professional. Romanes wrote
on Butler’s incompetence: ‘To this arena, [science] however, he is in no
way adapted, either by mental status or mental equipment’ (Romanes,
1881, p. 285). In response, in 1884, Butler published a short essay
entitled Remarks on George Romanes’ Mental evolution in Animals. The
aim of the essay was to show that Romanes in Mental evolution in
Animals (1883) used Lamarckism in a manner similar to Life and Habit
(Butler, 1884, p. 236). Butler analysed the terminology and examples
used by Romanes and discovered a clear overlap between the theory of
CRISTIANO TURBIL
mental evolution and his theory of memory as heredity (Butler, 1884,
pp. 240–243). For Butler, this would have convinced the scientiﬁc
community of the validity of his hypothesis of unconscious memory
which was, until then, rejected by British biologists as a pseudo-scientiﬁc
idea.
Consequently, it becomes necessary to question and analyse Butler’s
scientiﬁc writing to see whether he was just popularising the work of
others or if he was able, as declared in Life and Habit, to advance his
own personal vision of evolution just via knowing, analysing and
questioning the research of others.
Samuel Butler and the Idea of Unconscious Memory
In Butler’s work the word ‘unconscious’ described mechanical actions of
a living body including breathing, blood circulation and embryological
reproduction but also ‘actions which we have acquired with diﬃculty
and now perform almost unconsciously’ such as ‘playing a diﬃcult piece
of music, reading, talking, walking’ (Jones, 1930, p. 53). All of those
actions were guaranteed by the presence of a (biological) memory in the
human body. Memory, for Butler, was the key aspect of the hereditary
process because it could be physically reproduced. This was explained
clearly in his notebooks:
There is the reproduction of an idea which has been produced once
already, and there is the reproduction of a living form which has
been produced once already. The ﬁrst reproduction is certainly an
eﬀort of memory. It should not therefore surprise us if the second
reproduction should turn out to be an eﬀort of memory also. In-
deed all forms of reproduction that we can follow are based directly
or indirectly upon memory (Jones, 1930, p. 59).
In order to understand, the signiﬁcance of Butler’s theory of memory
and heredity, it is important to trace its development. At the beginning
of his career, Butler referred to ‘unconscious memory’ in his novels and
short essays. Between 1863 and 1878, Butler engaged with the debate of
evolution from a purely philosophical perspective. This is particularly
evident in the periodical articles ‘Darwin among the Machines’ (1863),
‘Lucubratio Ebria’ (1865), the novel Erewhon (1872) and Life and Habit
(1878). In the 1860s, Butler published two short philosophical articles in
the New Zealand periodical The Press: ‘Darwin among the Machines’
and ‘Lucubratio Ebria’. In these articles, Butler attempted to explain
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Darwin’s theory of natural selection in terms of the evolution of
machines (Jones, 1930, pp. 42–46). Butler also tried to question the role
played by mechanical tools such as notebooks and umbrellas in human
evolution (Jones, 1930, pp. 47–53). Butler’s articles oﬀered an anthro-
pological reading of Darwin’s natural selection in a language full of
sarcasm and improbable analogies. In these articles, Butler’s intention
was not only to teach or question evolution but only to make this new
scientiﬁc theory accessible to a New Zealand audience.
In the novel Erewhon (1872) Butler expanded upon the idea of ‘un-
conscious memory’ already proposed in 1863–1865, by producing a 25
page manifesto in which he discussed the diﬀerence between conscious
and unconscious actions whilst describing organic and inorganic evo-
lution. As Roger Robinson has explained, in the three chapters entitled
‘The book of the Machines’ Butler wrote his personal eulogy to Dar-
win’s Origin of Species taking evolution to its paradoxical extremes
(Robinson, 2007, pp. 21–44). The main merit of Erewhon, in advancing
Butler’s position about psychological evolution, is to ﬁnally present the
potential of ‘unconscious memory’. In the novel, ‘unconscious memory’
is the ‘medium’ which permits the preservation of life and makes the
generation of mechanical life possible.
Six years after the publication of Erewhon, Butler returned to ‘un-
conscious memory’ by proposing his idea in a diﬀerent manner. After
temporarily leaving his occupation as a novelist, between 1876 and
1877, Butler produced his ﬁrst philosophical book about unconscious
evolution: Life and Habit. Butler summarised Life and Habit’s theme as:
‘The identiﬁcation of heredity and memory, and the corollaries relating
to sports, the reversion to remote ancestors, the phenomena of old age,
the causes of the sterility of hybrids, and the principles underlying
longevity – all of which follow as a matter of course. This was ‘Life and
Habit’ [1877]’ (Jones, 1930, p. 66).
Although the book was presented as a scientiﬁc ‘publication’, by
discussing many of the topics that were in vogue during the period,
Butler’s critical approach can still be considered an example of ‘natural
philosophy’. It is important to be clear regarding the philosophical
nature of the text because this can explain why it was overlooked by the
scientiﬁc community. Life and Habit was based on a critical reﬂection
upon Darwin’s natural selection mediated with Lamarck’s hypothesis of
‘inheritance of acquired characteristics’. However, it also engaged with
philosophical topics including metaphysical and epistemological ques-
tions: Life and Habit aimed to be what Chambers’ Vestiges had been in
the 1840s. Life and Habit tried to present an argument that was engaging
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for philosophers, scientists and the public audience. However, it also
aimed to be, as declared by the writer in the text, ‘a valuable adjunct to
Darwinism’ (Butler, 1910a, p. 33). The ‘valuable adjunct’ was, indeed,
Lamarck’s philosophy of evolution. In Life and Habit, Lamarck played a
key role. Butler himself made this clear declaring in Luck, or Cunning?
(1887): ‘to Lamarck, therefore, I naturally turned, and soon saw that the
theory on which I had been insisting in’’ Life andHabit’’ was in reality an
easy corollary on his system’(Butler, 1910b, p. 9).
In Life and Habit, Butler also discussed Mivart’s Genesis of Species
(1871), Carpenter’s Mental Physiology (1874) and Ribot’s Heredity
(1875), especially in relation to the research of Henry Maudsley. Addi-
tionally, it was in this work that he provided accounts of Aristotle, So-
crates, Plato, Marcus Aurelius and St. Paul in order to establish a strong
link between Victorian science and an older metaphysics. Butler’s inten-
tion was to oﬀer to readers an accessible way to understand everything
regarding evolution and not just present the results of scientiﬁc research.
The philosophical nature of the book was also illustrated by the
examples and terminology Butler used. In Life and Habit Butler ex-
plained, citing and discussing large portions of Ribot’s work (and in
some way Lamarck), that humans have two diﬀerent types of memory:
‘intelligence’ and ‘instinct’. ‘Intelligence’ is the mode of memory ac-
quired through learning and habits. ‘Instinct’, by contrast, is a type of
memory which exists in our cells and connects any living creature with
its own ancestors. In explaining this diﬀerence Butler directly cited
Ribot’s Heredity: ‘‘‘Whereas intelligence is developed slowly by accu-
mulated experience, instinct is perfect from the ﬁrst’’ (‘‘Heredity,’’ p.
14)’ (Butler, 1910a, p. 198). In Life and Habit, Butler’s theory of
heredity was very close to Ribot’s although with one notable diﬀerence.
If for Ribot memory can only be understood in mechanical terms or as
biological accumulation (‘le capital accumule’), for Butler there was still
something missing. He wrote:
Obviously the memory of a habit or experience will not commonly
be transmitted to oﬀspring in that perfection which is called ‘‘in-
stinct,’’ till the habit or experience has been repeated in several
generations with more or less uniformity; for otherwise the
impression made will not be strong enough to endure through the
busy and diﬃcult task of reproduction (Butler, 1910a, p. 198).
Memory, for Butler, was something more than a simple mechanical
ability; it was the element which links the physical structure of the brain
with its metaphysical nature. For Butler, memory and body were linked
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together, as well as memory and heredity. Paraphrasing Life and Habit,
memory and heredity are the means of preserving experiences and
carrying them to the next generation.
Life and Habit did not receive enough attention from Victorian
readers and Butler’s idea was dismissed as an example of a philosophy
of life lacking any serious scientiﬁc acumen. In response to this criticism
Butler, in 1879, published Evolution Old and New, where he attempted to
trace the development of evolution before Charles Darwin. Although
not enlarging upon Butler’s theorisation of unconscious evolution, the
book provides an overview of Lamarck’s idea of ‘inheritance’ and its
inﬂuence on the pre- and post-Darwinian British debate. Butler himself
declared in Luck or Cunning?: ‘I wrote ‘‘Life and Habit’’ to show that
our mental and bodily acquisitions were mainly stores of memory: I
wrote ‘‘Evolution Old and New’’ to add that the memory must be a
mindful and designing memory’ (Butler, 1910b, p. 23). This explains the
secondary aim of Evolution Old and New which was to present memory
as something between ‘matter’ and ‘metaphysics’ linking the work of
Darwin with Lamarckism and highlighting their diﬀerences and simi-
larities.
In 1880 Butler tried to propose the idea of memory as heredity for
the second time. With the publication of Unconscious Memory, Butler
returned to the theory that the scientiﬁc community had as yet found
unconvincing. It was in this articulation of his conception of the role of
memory in evolution that Butler drew from Hering’s 1872 lecture: Das
Geda¨chtniss als allgemeine Funktion der organisirter Substanz. It can be
argued that the book is nothing more than a discussion of Hering’s
work used by Butler as a justiﬁcation of his own idea. This is because
Hering’s writing anticipated Butler’s theory using a language and a
methodology far better suited to the persuasion of the scientiﬁc com-
munity. Therefore, Butler decided to dedicate a large part of his Un-
conscious Memory to Hering’s work, providing an English translation of
the lecture. Speaking of this decision, Butler wrote (referring to Hering
and himself):
If two men so placed, after years of reﬂection, arrive independently
of one another at an identical conclusion as regards the manner in
which this machinery must have been invented and perfected, it is
natural that each should take a deep interest in the arguments of
the other, and be anxious to put them forward with the utmost
possible prominence (Butler, 1920, p. 53).
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Unconscious Memory presents two main diﬀerences to the previous
works. Firstly, Butler partially accepted Hering’s theory of memory as a
form of molecular vibration. The vibration theory was deﬁned as a
series of chemical changes that occur in a substance called ‘protoplasm’
through repetition (Butler, 1920, pp. 55–57). The word ‘protoplasm’
comes from the Greek protos (ﬁrst) and plasma (anything formed).
Protoplasm was introduced to the scientiﬁc language in 1846 by the
German botanist Hugo von Mohl (1805–1872). It was deﬁned as the
‘tough, slimy, granular, semi-ﬂuid’ substance within plant cells but
diﬀerent from the cell wall, nucleus and sap within the vacuole. In
Unconscious Memory, Butler explained that protoplasm ‘may be, and
perhaps is, the most living part of an organism, as the most capable of
retaining vibrations’ (Butler, 1920, p. 279).
The concept of protoplasm became very popular among British
biologists. In 1869 Huxley, in a famous pamphlet, deﬁned protoplasm
as the ‘physical basis of life’ (Huxley, 1869, pp 7–24). In 1879, G. J.
Allaman wrote in The Popular Science Monthly: ‘Protoplasm lies at the
base of every vital phenomenon. It is, as Huxley has expressed it, ‘the
physical basis of life;’ wherever there is life from its lowest to its highest
manifestation there is protoplasm; wherever there is protoplasm there is
life’ (Allman, 1879, pp. 721–722). However, the science of protoplasm
was not certain or precise. Butler, in particular, was not fully convinced
by this new theory. He wrote in Luck or Cunning?: ‘Science has not, I
believe, settled all the components of protoplasm, but this is neither here
nor there; she has settled what it is in great part, and there is no trusting
her not to settle the rest at any moment, even if she has not already done
so’ (Butler, 1910b, p. 125). The ﬁrst full account of Protoplasm was,
then, only published by the American chemist E. Newton Harvey in the
1938 article: ‘Some Physical Properties of Protoplasm’. Harvey de-
scribed protoplasm as: ‘an albuminous substance containing carbon,
hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen in extremely complex molecular com-
bination and capable under proper condition of manifesting certain
vital phenomena […]’(Harvey, 1938, p. 68).
In Unconscious Memory, Butler also expressed some partial doubts
on the vibration theory: ‘I am not committed to the vibration theory of
memory, though inclined to accept it on a primaˆ facie view. All I am
committed to is, that if memory is due to persistence of vibrations, so is
heredity; and if memory is not so due, then no more is heredity’ (Butler,
1920, p. 62). In saying this, Butler did not reject his Lamarckian view of
heredity proposed in 1878. Instead, he suggested that whilst he knew
nothing about the vibration theory when he wrote Life and Habit, this
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new biological advancement did not aﬀect his theory of memory and
heredity.
Unconscious Memory presented another novelty. In Life and Habit
Butler deﬁned himself as a member of the general public with the
intention of explaining evolution to a popular audience. In 1880, he left
the naive spirit of the previous books and placed himself next to Hering,
whilst still highlighting his status as a non practitioner of science. He
wrote:
Professor Hering and I, to use a metaphor of his own, are as men
who have observed the action of living beings upon the stage of the
world, he from the point of view at once of a spectator and of one
who has free access to much of what goes on behind the scenes, I
from that of a spectator only, with none but the vaguest notion of
the actual manner in which the stage machinery is worked (Butler,
1920, p. 53).
In his ﬁnal and most polemical book, Luck or Cunning? (1886), Butler
again proposed the Lamarckian mechanism of unconscious memory.
He tried to show how Lamarck’s theory of memory and heredity was
implicit in much of the teaching of Spencer, Romanes and other leading
biologists although hidden by the Darwinian shadow.
Luck or Cunning? did not present any signiﬁcant advancement of
Butler’s theory of memory as heredity proposed in Unconscious Mem-
ory. However, Butler returned to the idea of protoplasm and memory.
In particular, he accepted a more marked development in the vibration
hypothesis of memory given by Hering and only adopted with reserve in
Unconscious Memory. In the book, Butler also presented a strong
objection to ‘protoplasm as the only living substance’ (Butler, 1910b,
p. 127) as suggested by Huxley. Instead, Butler explained that proto-
plasm could only be accepted as corollary to his memory theory in
contrast to the use of protoplasm as a justiﬁcation of ‘the mindless
theory of natural selection’ (Butler, 1910b, p. 142). Butler was very ﬁrm
on this point. In his opinion, it was not possible to talk about heredity
and protoplasm without Lamarckian design. He declared ‘I have said
enough to show that in the decade, roughly, between 1870 and 1880 the
set of opinion among our leading biologists was strongly against mind’
(Butler, 1910b, p. 142).
Unfortunately, the author of Life and Habit was not able to see his
theory recognised by the scientiﬁc community during his lifetime. He
remained an outsider or, citing again Romanes’ review, he remained, at
least to his contemporary English men of science, ‘in no way adapted,
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either by mental status or mental equipment’ to take part in the evo-
lutionary debate (Romanes, 1881, p. 285).
The Afterlife of the Idea of Unconscious Memory
While Butler’s ideas made little headway in England, they fared better
abroad. In the early twentieth century Butler’s science of the mind be-
came recognised through the popularisation of Marcus Hartog (1851–
1924) and Eugenio Rignano, as the ‘Butler/Hering theory.’ Marcus
Hartog is central to the new ‘understanding’ of Butler’s science in the
early twentieth century. Educated in biology and an expert in natural
history, Hartog was one of the major followers of Butler’s theory of
memory and heredity. His interpretation of Butler’s work focused on
the assumption that Butler’s notion of unconscious memory was not an
isolated case in Europe. In his introduction of the 1910 edition of Un-
conscious Memory, Hartog explained how Butler’s evolutionary idea
was linked to the work of Hering and Ribot, creating a European
parallel between those authors. He wrote: ‘Unconscious Memory was
largely written to show the relation of Butler’s views to Hering’s, and
contains an exquisitely written translation of the Address’ (Butler, 1920,
pp. 15–16).
In 1914 Hartog published in the Italian periodical Scientia the article
‘Samuel Butler et les Recentes theories Biologique de la Memoire’ where
he deﬁned Butler as one of the most unique spirits of the whole Vic-
torian period (Hartog, 1914, p. 40). He explained that Butler’s ﬁnest
merit was not only that of being able to popularise science to the general
audience, but also being an inspiration to science in the twentieth cen-
tury (Hartog, 1914, p. 55). It is also important to highlight that the
article was published in the journal Scientia which, at the beginning of
the twentieth century, was publishing the ‘avant-garde’ of the science of
the mind.
One of the editors of Scientia was the Italian Eugenio Rignano.
Engineer, philosopher and writer, Rignano was an exponent of the
Italian neo-Lamarckian movement. Rignano published widely on
philosophical and scientiﬁc topics. His main book Sulla Trasmissibilita`
dei Caratteri Acquisiti (1907) explained the process of inheritance in a
manner very similar to that of Hering (and indirectly Butler). However,
what is interesting in Rignano’s work is how he insisted on the mne-
monic process as a concrete possibility in explaining the hereditary
mechanism. Similarly, in the review of August Pauly’s Darwinismus und
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Lamarckismus (1907), Rignano explained how the position of Pauly was
developed – starting from the big discoveries in the organic memory
debate advanced by Hering (Rignano, 1907, p. 195).
The writings of both Hartog and Rignano present an unexpected
portrait of Butler’s idea of memory and heredity. During his lifetime,
Butler’s work was neglected and ignored by the British scientiﬁc com-
munity to whom he tried to communicate it. However, Butler has
posthumously been recognised not only as a populariser of Hering’s
ideas, but also as a contributor to the debate about the mechanisms of
evolution. Rignano was not alone in placing Butler’s name alongside
that of Ribot and Hering as an important ﬁgure. At the beginning of the
twentieth-century, Butler was instead considered, alongside The´odule-
Armand Ribot and Ewald Hering, a relevant ﬁgure of the post-Dar-
winian debate on heredity. In 1923, S. J. Tomekeieﬀ’s article: ‘The
Mnemic Theories of Evolution’ (also published in Scientia) was correct
in deﬁning Butler as the writer ‘whose genius is not yet fully appreciated
even in his own country’ (Tomekeieﬀ, 1923, p. 160). Tomekeieﬀ’s quote
perfectly summarises the content of this article which, I hope, has shed
some light upon the place of Butler in the late nineteenth century pan-
European debate about evolution and psychology.
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